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Abstract
In an effort to develop strong cyber resilience, international organizations, academic institutions,
corporations and countries have been actively working to develop cybersecurity frameworks (CSFs).
Such efforts emphasize various perspectives depending on the organization’s intention, while their
contents involve the same concept. The aim of this paper is to incorporate the many varied
perspectives on CSFs and gather them into a concise view by contrasting different intentions and
distilling shared concepts. To do so, this study uses the document analysis method alongside two
cycles of coding (descriptive coding and pattern coding) to excerpt 12 extant CSFs. The various
intentions can be cascaded with respect to four areas: 1) the promoted action, 2) the driver, 3) the
framework milieu and 4) the audience. The frameworks can also be examined according to three
common concepts: 1) shared actions, 2) cyber pillars and 3) the framework life cycle. A total of seven
shared actions are distilled from the frameworks, while the human, organizational, infrastructure,
technology and law and regulation pillar are the most frequently discussed excerpts from the CSFs.
Moreover, there are three processes for securing cyberspace: profiling, delivering and assuring. The
shared concepts presented in this paper may also be useful for developing a general model of a CSF.
Keywords: cybersecurity framework, cybersecurity policy, cybersecurity strategy, cybersecurity
shared actions, cyber pillars, framework life cycle

1 Introduction
The steep rise of digital activity in modern life has created the need for strong cyber resilience. One
important aspect of developing such resilience is the creation of cybersecurity policies (CSPs) that
are able to coordinate and reinforce the efforts of a range of stakeholders (Henschke and Ford 2016;
Pawlak and Barmpaliou 2017; Tiirmaa-Klaar 2016). Guiding policymakers in the development of CSPs
are cybersecurity frameworks (CSFs). Writing CSFs has been the work of intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic institutions, corporations
and governments (ITU 2017a). From 2004 to 2015, twelve CSFs have been proposed.
CSFs are commonly advocated with the intention of helping policymakers to define cybersecurity
strategy by way of a policy template. Given the proliferation of CSFs, how do policymakers adopt a
normative position by which to judge their value and utility? CSFs vary widely in terms of, for
example, engagement focus (global vs. regional), applicability (new vs. existing), and areas of
improvement (identify vs. address) (ITU, 2016). The needs of countries and organizations vary widely
in terms of economics and culture, so it is not straightforward to choose a template without
understanding the underlying assumptions and goals of the framework authors. We found limited
work comprehensively and systematically reviewing CSFs (i.e. the work of Sabillon et al. 2016). To
that end, this paper endeavours to develop a ‘bird’s-eye view’ on CSFs to better assist policymakers
in their deliberations.
In an attempt to create a single reference outline for all existing frameworks, this paper aims to
sketch shared concepts underlying the current frameworks. The paper describes the systematic
extraction of shared concepts using a qualitative coding method (Saldana 2015). Accordingly, the
paper enables an evidence-based appraisal of current cybersecurity policies.

2 Domain of cyber security: conundrum
Although the term cybersecurity is prominently used in modern conversations and statements
(CCDCOE 2017), this term is regarded as interchangeablewith other security domain terminology,
such as information security, network security and internet security. As such definitions and
explanations diverge, questions arise as to whether: (1) cybersecurity is actually information
security; (2) information security is part of cybersecurity; (3) cyberattacks are uniquely associated
with information/data; and (4) cybersecurity is replacing information security (von Solms and von
Solms 2018).
Apart from such debates, in order to clarify the position taken, we attempt to inclusively consolidate
some definitions of cybersecurity while simultaneously trying not to be too broad. The following
narrowed-down definition of ‘cybersecurity’ will be used to delineate the research in this paper.
Throughout the paper, by cybersecurity we mean:
securing a virtual digital environment by governance, management and assurance, including
its assets (i.e. information assets and cyber assets), entities (such as end users, organizations,
governments, societies, machines and software), and interactions (enabled by IT
infrastructure, communications/networks, systems and devices)
(acknowledging definition from ISACA 2013; ISO/IEC 2013; ITU 2012; von Solms and van
Niekerk 2013; WEF 2012a).

We also consolidate the definition of ‘framework’ used in this study, since different terms are used
in each document (see the CSF list in ITU 2016, or refer to Table 1). Although CSFs are expressed by
different names, and various terms are used, by framework we mean a document that is intended to
support policymakers in defining their cybersecurity strategies. Throughout this paper, CSF is defined
as
a document that is promoted with the intention of helping policymakers (i.e., the
government or the C-level in an organization) to define cybersecurity strategy/policy by way
of a policy template.
Therefore, the term ‘framework’ in this paper is inclusive of the terms ‘agenda’ (ITU 2017b, 2012;
Schjølberg 2007), ‘cybersecurity strategy’ (EC 2013; OAS 2004), ‘cybersecurity framework’ (BSA
2010; NIST 2014), ‘model’ (GCSCC 2014), and ‘principles’, ‘guideline’ and ‘manual’ (CTO 2015;
ISO/IEC 2012; Microsoft 2013; WEF 2012b).

3 Methodology
In this paper, we use the grounded theory paradigm to capture the essential concepts shared across
CSFs as well as the differences between them. Grounded theory is commonly used to illuminate
concepts based on empirical phenomena and is compatible with an inductive process of analysing
data (Roman et al. 2017; Scott and Glaser 1967). The specific application of the grounded theory
paradigm relies on document analysis (Bowen 2009). In doing so, we apply a four-step research
protocol: 1) defining the research scope, 2) document selection, 3) coding and 4) synthesizing the
concept (see Figure 1).

INSERT FIGURE 1
Figure 1. Research protocol

3.1 Defining the scope of research
As a guide to achieving this study’s goal, we define three research questions:
RQ.1 What perspectives and contexts are perceived in CSFs?
RQ.2 What shared concepts are evident in CSFs?
RQ.3 What common life cycles are suggested when developing a cybersecurity strategy?
RQ.1 is intended to compare and contrast CSFs, as their purposes and intentions vary. RQ.2 is
intended to capture the shared essential concept by distilling the frameworks. Finally, in RQ.3, we
seek to identify the common lifecycle considered for securing cyberspace.

3.2 Document selection method
The method used to collect and select the research artefacts (i.e. appropriate CSF documents) for
this study is divided into two filtering steps: 1) defining the search strategy and 2) filtering using the
inclusion and exclusion criteria.
We limit our search strategy to documents created by IGOs, NGOs, academic institutions,
corporations and governments intended to guide policymakers in defining cybersecurity strategies

by way of a policy template. Therefore, the search strategy incorporates the following keywords,
which are input into internet search engines (e.g. Google, Bing): cybersecurity framework,
cybersecurity manual, cybersecurity guideline, cybersecurity standard and cybersecurity principle.
We found 26 documents that are relevant to our search strategy. See Table 1 for a list of the
documents.
Table 1. Cybersecurity framework documents

INSERT TABLE 1

Next, to narrow our scope, we apply inclusion and exclusion criteria. We define these as follows.
1. Inclusion criteria:
a. The document is intended for use as a policy template for cybersecurity strategy, issued
by any organization;
b. The document is a complementary document matched to one included under inclusion
criterion (a) that takes the form of a report, matrix or evaluation; and
c. The document appears in a publicly available data source.
2. Exclusion criteria
a. The document serves as a policy template for another security domain (i.e. information
security, network security, internet security);
b. The document is solely intended as a cybersecurity report, matrix or evaluation;
In selecting the relevant framework we decide to omit those which are not aligned to our definition
(see section 2). For example, the ISO/IEC 27001 framework focuses largely on information security
but limitedly recognizes the global importance of interaction in cyberspace (ISO/IEC 2013). Similarly,
some CSFs focus exclusively on IT infrastructure, such as NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
(NERC 2017). We also omit overly operational and overly technical frameworks, since we aim to
study a policy template. Therefore, there are some frameworks that are not included in this paper
such as the ETSI Cyber Security Standard (TC CYBER 2018) and RFC 2196 (IETF 1997). Since our
definitions in section 2 imply that cybersecurity works across national and organizational borders
(the ITU definition 1), this study embraces frameworks that are purposely designed to address
national interests, such as the Microsoft CSF (Microsoft 2013).
After applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria, we were left with 17 documents, which fall under
12 frameworks, as shown in Table 2. The CSF documents for the following analysis were compiled
from 2004 to 2014. Table 2 shows the list of frameworks sorted by their year of initial creation.
Table 2. Cybersecurity frameworks from IGOs, NGOs, academic institutions, corporations and governments

INSERT TABLE 2

3.3 Coding technique
Along with the document analysis method, we employ a two-cycle coding technique (Saldaña 2013).
In the first cycle of coding, we group the concepts using descriptive coding. Concepts are gathered
and grouped according to the pattern that emerged in each document.
1

“Cybersecurity is information security with jurisdictional uncertainty and attribution issues.” (ITU 2012, p. 11)

To develop a general understanding, a context is derived based on the patterns that appeared from
the first cycle. In the second cycle, we use a pattern coding technique (Saldaña 2013). Codes from
the first cycle are grouped if they share a similar understanding. We used NVIVO software to
facilitate the coding process.
Thus, in the next sections, we divide our discussion into two main parts. The first part, which is
presented in section 4, includes our findings as we compare and contrast the existing frameworks.
The discussion in this part focuses on elaborating the descriptive coding outcomes: the strategic
actions, drivers, framework environments and audience of the different CSFs. The second part,
which is presented in section 5, reports our findings elaborating similar concepts shared across the
frameworks (coding and synthesis).

4 Cybersecurity frameworks: the various contexts
Differences can be detected in every CSF that depend on the framework setting or context. We
define the context that influences the framework, as each framework has unique aspects or
distinctive circumstances. We typify the context into four background factors: 1) promoted action, 2)
driver, 3) milieu and 4) audience.
The promoted action is the desired or recommended action that links to the core cybersecurity
programme. The driver is the factor that motivated the creation of the cyber strategy. The milieu is
the situational setting in which the CSF can be used. The audience is the intended user of the CSF.
These contexts are summarized in Table 3. Each aspect will be discussed in sub-sections 4.1 to 4.5.
Table 3. Various contexts of cybersecurity frameworks

INSERT TABLE 3

4.1 The promoted action
The promoted action is the approach that the framework recommends the organization take before
implementing its cybersecurity strategy. The overall defined direction of the promoted action
further describes the conduct of the cyber strategy. The promoted actions in CSFs can be classified
into two main categories. The first category promotes collaborative action (outward strategy), while
in contrast, the second type advocates increasing the cyber capacity of the organization (inward
strategy).
The first type, positive interdependence, which emphasizes collaborative action, promotes
cooperation among the entities in cyberspace. It adopts the idea that cybersecurity is a shared
responsibility given the challenges associated with the interdependencies of all cyberspace
stakeholders (BSA 2010; EC 2013; ISO/IEC 2012; Schjølberg 2007). Therefore, securing cyberspace is
not solely the responsibility of one organization; instead, it should become a shared endeavour and
thus requires partnership among the stakeholders (WEF 2012a). This type includes CSFs such as the
ISO/IEC 27032, WEF Principles and Guidelines, ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda, OAS Cybersecurity
Strategy and CTO Cybersecurity Guidelines.
In contrast to externally-directed strategic action, the other type of promoted action advocates an
inward process and promotes fortifying the organization internally through cyber capacity-building.
While the outward promoted action focuses on collaborating to combat cyberthreats, it is also

essential for an organization to have sufficient cyber capacity to be a trusted and strong entity within
the network (WEF 2012b). Therefore, some CSFs, such as Oxford University CMM and the NIST
Framework, advocate increasing organizational capacity-building, for example by building human
resource capacity, strengthening critical information infrastructures, and strengthening internal
systems (i.e. regulations, laws and organizational structure).

4.2 The drivers
The analysis of CSFs suggests that cybersecurity strategy can be driven by two factors: risk and
values. Risk-centric and value-centric drivers are found to influence actions and the overall
development of a cybersecurity strategy. The goal of the first factor, the risk-centric driver, is to
minimize the risks caused by cyberthreats. This common driver holds a justified role within
cybersecurity strategy because cyberspace is characterized by uncertainty, and risk needs to be
assessed and managed (ISACA 2013; Microsoft 2013; NIST 2014).
While some CSFs emphasize preventing the risks caused by cyberthreats, others advise focusing on
aligning the values of the organization such as a national commitment or business goals with the
cybersecurity strategy. Therefore, the second factor, the value-centric driver, appears in certain
contexts to indicate that the creation of the cybersecurity strategy was driven or framed by a certain
value (or the country’s commitment/outcome-focus thereto (CTO 2015; Klimburg 2012)). For such,
drivers that are influenced by the country’s commitment can be derived from a state declaration,
whether it is directed by the state or by other states (i.e. through treaty) to
organizations/communities (i.e. mandates and charters), to private entities/societies (i.e.
expectations and political considerations) (Klimburg 2012, pp. 146–90), or based on national values
(Schaake and Vermeulen 2016). Within this value-centric context, creating cyber policy means
regarding cyberspace not only as an insulated single domain but also as a domain involving the
political situation and national strategy (Klimburg 2012). Therefore, securing cyberspace implicates a
dynamic situation. For example, the Commonwealth CSF encourages alignment with Commonwealth
values, such as protecting fundamental human rights, preserving an open, free and secure
cyberspace, increasing democracy, maintaining international peace and security, and encouraging
sustainable development (CTO 2015). Within the organization, this can take the form of aligning the
business strategy to the security strategy (ISACA 2013; NIST 2014), meaning attaching the
cybersecurity function based on the business environment, business values, business purposes,
business objectives and security purposes (ISACA 2013; NIST 2014).
The CSFs that advocate for value-centric drivers can be found primarily in the IGO CSFs, such as in
the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Strategy Guidelines, EU Cybersecurity Strategy, CCDCOE Cyber
Security Framework and ITU-GCA (see Table 4), where the main intention is to promote their
institutional values.
Table 4. Aspiring value-centric drivers for developing cyber strategy

INSERT TABLE 4

4.3 The framework milieu
Within the range of CSFs, a single framework cannot be adopted and directly implemented by an
organization without knowing whether the environment is suitable. For example, the NIST
Framework is not suitable for promoting interdependence, as it was developed for implementation

by the owner of national critical information infrastructure (NIST 2014). Each framework has a
different context and scope, which we call the framework milieu. The framework milieu is the
background and the context for the framework.
Viewing the scope of the milieu, some frameworks are intended to provide a solution at the
organizational level, while others are intended for use at the regional level or the international level
(which requires a positive interdependence between international cyber entities). At the
organizational level, taking the NIST Framework and CMM as examples, the framework can be
appropriately implemented given only a narrow scope within the internal organizational setting,
such as to strengthen the organization’s cyber capacity or critical information infrastructure. Other
frameworks, such as the ITU-GCA, have a broad scope, which can only work in international
circumstances that need positive interdependence between each entity, such as through
international cooperation and collaboration. Further frameworks only work for particular audiences.
These are usually frameworks that are built for a member of an IGO that has shared institutional
values, such as the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Guidelines and the CCDCOE Manual. In this case,
the primary purpose of this framework is to engage with each member sharing the institutional
values.
Based on those cases, we can divide the environmental setting (milieu) into three levels with respect
to their different circumstances, engagement and scope: the first level is the organizational level, the
second is the regional level, and the third is the international level. The organizational level typically
addresses increasing the capacity of the organization, while the other two target positive
interdependence. The organizational framework can be used as a framework complementary to a
higher-level framework; for example, the CMM, ISACA and NIST frameworks can be used to
strengthen the organizational level, while the organization may also implement another high-level
framework alongside an organizational type framework. The regional framework is typically built to
address the specific needs of the country members, which have similar shared institutional values,
such as the OAS Cybersecurity Strategy for OAS members or the Commonwealth Cybersecurity
Guidelines for Commonwealth countries. Finally, the international framework type emphasizes
positive interdependence that is cooperative and collaborative with any organization with the same
interests.

4.4 The audiences
The audience or the intended users of CSFs can be divided into two audience categories: (1) the
audience-specific CSF and (2) the across-the-board CSF. CSFs with the first type of audience are
primarily devoted and addressed to specific organizations that share institutional values within the
originating organization. Therefore, these CSFs are created for a specific type of audience. For
example, the NIST Framework was developed in response to Presidential Executive Order 13636 2, as
this framework was initially built for the critical information infrastructure operator in the United
States of America. Other examples include CSFs that were built by an IGO, such as the OAS
Cybersecurity Strategy, the EU Cybersecurity Strategy and the Commonwealth Cybersecurity
Guidelines, which were created for their country members by an IGO and aligned with the IGO’s
mission. This occurred because most IGOs, such as OAS, ITU, EU/ENISA, NATO/CCDCOE and CTO,

The Presidential Executive Order 13636 (“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,”) was issued on 12
February 2013 and calls for the development of a voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework (NIST
Framework).

2

developed their CSFs with a focus on advocating their country members’ creation of a cybersecurity
strategy.
The second type of CSF has general applicability in terms of its audience and focuses on helping
organizations increase their capacity to reduce cyberthreats; these can be used by any organization,
without them needing to share a similar institutional value background. This type of CSF is usually
built by NGOs and academic institutions, such as the University of Oxford, ISO/IEC, Microsoft or the
BSA.
While the context of CSFs can be divided into four categories, which are the promoted action
(positive independence vs. increasing capacity), the drivers (risk-centric vs. value-centric), the
framework milieu (organizational, regional and international), and the audience (audience-specific
vs. across-the-board), frameworks can have demi-classifications, meaning that it is possible for
classifications to fall between categories. For example, while the NIST Framework was developed
based on the Presidential Executive Order, it can be used by organizations or critical infrastructure
companies outside the USA. A similar situation is observed for the WEF Framework, which is
intended for its members who focus on securing economic relationships. However, the principles
and guidelines in the framework can potentially be adopted globally by any organization.

5 Cybersecurity frameworks: shared concepts
Although there are various perspectives on and contexts for CSFs, we also see that there are some
similarities shared across the frameworks. For example, the CMM Section D2-1 mentions the Cyber
Security Mindset (GCSCC 2014, pp. 19–20), which is similar to the Commonwealth Cybersecurity
Guideline ‘developing a culture of Cybersecurity awareness among citizens’ (CTO 2015, p. 11).
Considering these two concepts, we can see that they share a similar principle, which is developing a
cyber culture. To extract this shared concept, we use two cycles of coding as described earlier:
descriptive coding and pattern coding.
The first cycle is descriptive coding, which aims to excerpt similar concepts from the frameworks into
codes. We find that there are thirty shared concepts from the documents (see Figure 2 and Table 5).
The second cycle summarizes the thirty concepts into a smaller number of sets or themes to gain a
better normative position of the current frameworks. Using pattern coding, we assemble the thirty
codes into two main themes, which are 1) based on similar actions and 2) based on objects that need
to be secured (we call this a cyber pillar).
The process behind these two cycles of coding is presented in Figure 2. The middle figure represents
shared concepts identified in the documents. The figure on the left represents the cybersecurity
pillar. These pillars are used to support and underpin cybersecurity. The figure on the right
represents the shared actions. The frameworks commonly promote these actions to secure
cyberspace.
We also highlight the common life cycle of securing cyberspace, which is called the cybersecurity life
cycle. The cybersecurity life cycle is a series of processes and a step-by-step routine for securing
cyberspace as a project that usually comprises the processes of initial planning, process
implementation and evaluation.
These findings will be elaborated upon in the next sections.

INSERT FIGURE 2

Figure 2. Theme development process

5.1 Cybersecurity framework actions
Table 5 shows the concepts shared among CSFs. We have composed the shared concepts from the
12 frameworks using NVIVO and descriptive coding. In Table 5, we group the shared concepts into
themes based on their similarity of action (see the shaded columns) using pattern coding. We found
that there were seven themes that contribute to the CSF: building online trust, creating
coordination, cooperation and collaboration, profiling the cyber state, promoting uptake, reviewing,
establishing a legal environment, and creating standards. A detailed discussion will be elaborated in
sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7.
Table 5. Shared concepts of cybersecurity frameworks

INSERT TABLE 5

5.1.1

Building online trust

In creating a cybersecurity strategy, some CSFs recommend that policy creation should focus on
enhancing the confidence of stakeholders in the online environment or building online trust. It
means not only giving stakeholders (e.g. consumer, business and the government) confidence in the
online form (BSA 2010) but also ensuring the availability of infrastructure (in other words, increasing
the resilience of infrastructure and servicing critical information infrastructure (ITU 2012)). This can
be achieved, for example, by providing a data protection and privacy regulation framework (BSA
2010), developing a national cyber contingency plan/national crisis management (EC 2013; Klimburg
2012), and providing critical information protection (Klimburg 2012).
There are three shared concepts that contribute to building online trust:
1. Increasing digital redundancy: to maintain resilience and capabilities of services that are
impaired due to a cybersecurity event.
2. Protecting critical assets in cyberspace: to protect intangible and tangible critical assets, such
as privacy, data and infrastructure.
3. Promoting privacy online: to protect personally identifiable information against
unauthorized access and disclosure.
5.1.2

Coordination, cooperation and collaboration

Given the wide range of cybersecurity protection necessary, including protection at the personal,
societal, organizational, national and international levels as well as securing global cyberspace, it
cannot be handled solely by one entity. Protecting cyberspace requires cooperation from every
entity, and moreover, the cyber environment needs a cumulative defence. This means that each
entity needs to continually work to maintain (and improve) its cyber capacity in order to be a trusted
player in cyberspace (WEF 2015). As a result, protecting cyberspace demands action to ensure
coordination, cooperation and collaboration with all cybersecurity stakeholders.
There are two types of recommended actions on coordination, cooperation and collaboration (CCC).
We can divide the actions related to the organizational relationship into external and internal
actions. The first category involves outreach to other entities through cooperation and collaboration.
Outreach can be achieved, for example, through alliances and partnerships with other organizations,
empowering cyber diplomacy and soft power, conducting information sharing on combating threats,

sharing responsibility by promoting inclusion, and increasing the cyber capacity of neighbouring
entities (or uptake by third parties).
The second category involves increasing internal coordination (or inward coordination) within an
entity’s organizational structure. This type of action is intended to increase communication to all of
the entity stakeholders, coordinate all entity stakeholders regarding the cybersecurity mandate, and
create cyber governance with clear roles and responsibilities.
5.1.3

Profiling the cyber state

Some CSFs recommend measuring the needs and objectives at hand before taking action on
protecting cyberspace; this is called profiling the cyber state. The profiling action includes setting
goals and related resources that are needed to secure cyberspace, which is a preliminary,
preparatory action before the next action begins. Three actions are part of profiling the cyber state:
aligning strategy with core values; budgeting and preparing related resources; and formulating
assumptions.
The first advised action, aligning strategy, is intended to establish conduct that is coherent with the
current core values. The core values should apply as much in cyberspace as in the physical world; for
example, they should align with the current business processes (ISACA 2013; NIST 2014). When used
at a higher level, such as at the country level, such core values may refer to an existing arrangement
(or country commitment), which can be derived from a state declaration such as a treaty, mandate,
charter, public expectation or political decision (Klimburg 2012, pp. 146–90).
The second action, budgeting and resourcing, entails defining budgets and resources prior to
implementation, such as people, service and infrastructure, and funding. This includes, for example,
allocating and ensuring adequate resources (BSA 2010; CTO 2015; GCSCC 2014; ISACA 2013;
Microsoft 2013), taking stock of the status of key elements of the strategy (ENISA 2012a), and
pairing and assigning goals to resources using metrics (ISACA 2013; Klimburg 2012; NIST 2014).
The third action, formulating assumptions, means assessing what the organization needs in the
context of the cyber environment. This includes, for example, creating risk profiles, profiling the
assets that should be protected, determining what security requirements are needed, assessing
vulnerabilities, establishing pre-conditions, and setting the overall goals or target to be achieved.
Actions in this step are intended to describe the organization’s cybersecurity posture and target its
cybersecurity state as well as to identify and prioritize the context.
5.1.4

Promoting uptake

Promoting uptake means increasing an entity’s cyber capacity by promoting the adoption of CSF. In
addition to CCC, it is also important to consider actions in relation to other entities in cyberspace
(which is discussed in section 5.1.2). Promoting uptake can be considered a significant aspect of this
relationship because, to strengthen cybersecurity, it is important to be a trusted organization in
cyberspace. The CCC actions and promoting uptake are intertwined. While the CCC reflects outward
action to collaborate with all entities and stakeholders, the primary intention of promoting uptake is
internally directed strategic action to strengthen the entity so that it is trusted in cyberspace (WEF
2012b).
Promoting uptake means creating a strong cyber environment by empowering various entities
(people, the society, organizations and the country). Such action can take the form of increasing
awareness, building a cyber culture, investing in research and innovation, using innovative

technology, increasing cyber responsiveness, and conducting training and education on
cybersecurity.
5.1.5

Reviewing

Action taken to secure cyberspace also needs to be reviewed to ensure that the cybersecurity
programme is delivering on its targets. Reviewing is intended to readjust the strategy and to realign
the programme to achieve the intended goal. Examples of such actions include creating audits and
logs, receiving feedback, conducting self-assessments, and refining the programme.
Creating audits and logs entails establishing due care and analysis of the current implementation.
Audits and logs make it possible to record security incidents, which in turn allows the organization to
better apprise, understand and react to the current threat landscape and readjust its strategy to
achieve the goal (CTO 2015; ENISA 2014; GCSCC 2014; NIST 2014). Audits and logs can also be used
to verify compliance relevant to cyber risk exposure (WEF 2012b).
Aside from creating audits and logs, action also needs to be assessed. Programme assessment can be
conducted internally or by involving an outside observer. The first approach is pursued by
conducting self-assessments, for example, by creating metrics or key performance indicators (KPIs)
(CTO 2015; ENISA 2012b; Microsoft 2013), continuous monitoring (WEF 2012b), and benchmarking
(GCSCC 2014). The second approach is pursued by receiving feedback. Receiving feedback means
involving an outside observer to report on incidents or misconduct activities. An internal observer
might miss certain weaknesses, so by receiving feedback from an outsider the organization gains the
advantage of using another perspective to improve the programme. Taking this feedback can take
the form of organizing cyber exercises (ENISA 2014), receiving feedback from an individual expert or
receiving feedback from societies (GCSCC 2014). Programme refinement is the ultimate goal of this
step. The aim here is to refine the programme and evaluate it to improve strategy to the extent that
continuous improvement is achieved. Evaluating and adjusting the cybersecurity strategy can be
achieved by identifying lessons, good practices and bad practices during each activity (ENISA 2012b),
and by creating audits and logs and through assessment.
5.1.6

Establishing a legal environment

The legal environment provides a basis for conduct in cyberspace that draws a border between what
is permissible and what is misconduct. Appropriate laws and regulations are needed to prevent and
deter misconduct (OAS 2004). Most CSFs advise the organization to determine what legal conduct is
and to establish a legal environment. Establishing a legal environment involves creating a legal
framework as a basis for distinguishing between legal and illegal activities in cyberspace. Establishing
a legal environment can also be used as a rationale to take corrective action against malicious
activities in cyberspace. The theme of establishing a legal environment is distilled from the shared
action included in some frameworks, ranging from defining policies to creating strategies and
frameworks to policy enforcement.
Defining policies means creating a legal rationale for conduct. When defining such policy, the CSFs
recommend considering some specific aspects:
1.

The policy should recognize the nature of the internet (BSA 2010; EC 2013), meaning that it
should preserve openness and the free flow of information (EC 2013; OECD 2012).
2. The policy should keep pace with all aspects of modern cybercriminal activity (BSA 2010;
NIST 2014).

3. The policy should encourage cooperation and be designed using existing international and
regional frameworks as references (EC 2013; GCSCC 2014; ITU 2012; NIST 2014; OAS 2004;
Schjølberg 2007).
4. The policy should be used to minimize risk and as a form of deterrence against misuse (CTO
2015; ISO/IEC 2012; OAS 2004; WEF 2015).
Policy implementation should also create a strategy and framework, meaning it must develop a
strategy, mechanism and roadmap that function as a tactical or even a direct mandate to secure
cyberspace. Implementation is intended to actually deliver operational national cybersecurity
(Klimburg 2012). The strategy and framework should responsively adapt to changing socio-political,
threat and technology environments and integrate across all policy domains (GCSCC 2014; ITU
2017b; WEF 2014).
One important pillar in establishing the legal environment is enacting laws, which can be done by
law enforcement. Law enforcement means enacting cybersecurity law by taking corrective action in
response to misconduct. Since cybercrime rings span the globe and have a broad set of stakeholders
and a broad scope, there are some advised considerations for law enforcement:
1. Law enforcement should be employed as a tool to deter and punish cybercrime (BSA 2010;
Schjølberg 2007).
2. Law enforcement must engage across jurisdictions; therefore, addressing cybercrime
demands international cooperation and coordination (BSA 2010; ENISA 2012b; Schjølberg
2007).
3. Enforcing the law in cyberspace requires a comprehensive understanding of both innovative
technology and appropriate legal approaches, as well as sufficient specialized resources and
capabilities (i.e. investigators, prosecutors and judges) to cover cybercrime offences (BSA
2010; GCSCC 2014; Schjølberg 2007; WEF 2014).
5.1.7

Creating standards

Protecting cyberspace requires effective and efficient action, which can be realized by adopting best
practices and standardizing conduct. These can be accomplished by creating a standard, which also
means promoting interoperability and systemizing conduct.
Promoting interoperability means following recognized cybersecurity standards that are accepted
internationally. There are some recognized standards from standards organizations that can be
employed as a policy template, guideline or technology (OAS 2004).
Organizations can also standardize their conduct by developing and establishing a minimum
requirement of conduct. An example of this is creating practical and effective implementation
programmes and technical guidelines. This action aims to minimize overlapping action between one
entity and others. For example, the Law Enforcement Governance Framework, which standardizes
legal conduct, is used to minimize overlapping functions and structures across investigatory,
policymaking and regulatory bodies against cybercrime (ITU 2012).

5.2 Cybersecurity pillars
In addition to grouping shared concepts into certain themes, we can also see that, from another
perspective, the CSFs discuss securing similar objects. In this context, we call these objects pillars. As
in a building’s structure, these pillars are used to support and underpin cybersecurity, and they need

to be strengthened together. The shared concepts of the CSF can be merged into similar objects or
pillars.
Through the theme development process, as depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3, we conclude that
there are five main pillars that build cybersecurity: human, organizational, infrastructure, technology
and law and regulation.
INSERT FIGURE 3
Figure 3. The five pillars of cybersecurity

The human pillar is the most fundamental, and arguably the weakest, element of cybersecurity that
needs to be secured. While the cyberspace foundation is built by technology, the human drives and
controls it (ISACA 2013, pp. 72–4). Since humans represent the main actor enabling cybersecurity,
lack of awareness and insufficient knowledge makes humans the major challenge and the most
vulnerable pillar relative to the others. In addition, addressing knowledge inadequacies is not a
straightforward task as it requires education, training and time. This is the reason why CSFs
recommend promoting uptake by increasing awareness, developing a cybersecurity culture, and
providing training and education to strengthen this pillar.
The organizational pillar focuses on the institutions inside cyberspace. It is the functional structure
that controls cyberspace. Strengthening this pillar can be further separated into two tactics, namely,
(1) internally directed strategic action such as increasing the capacity and capability of the
organization and (2) externally directed strategic action, which is intensifying cooperation to secure
cyberspace. For example, the first tactic can be realized by securing the budget and resources for the
organization and increasing responsiveness to cyberthreats. However, each organization in
cyberspace also needs to cooperate with the others, such as by creating clear roles and
responsibilities for each organization, coordinating stakeholders, sharing information on threats, and
creating alliances and partnerships.
The infrastructure pillar is the most critical element of cyberspace. It is the environment that
constitutes cyberspace. Without infrastructure, cyberspace is nothing; therefore, strengthening this
pillar is necessary for supporting the cyber environment. If this pillar is weak, transactions in
cyberspace could collapse. Therefore, most CSFs address infrastructure issues, including how to
secure critical information infrastructure. The NIST Framework is the most pertinent for securing the
critical information infrastructure. In most cases, the CII differs from one organization to another,
depending on each organization’s needs and cyber profile.
The technology pillar is the pillar that empowers cyberspace. As cyberspace comprises the most
advanced technology (ITU and ABIresearch 2014), strengthening this pillar primarily entails adopting
the leading technology, such as by espousing technology that supports cybersecurity and enabling
research and development.
The law and regulation pillar structures cybersecurity and creates a coercive environment in
cyberspace. This pillar focuses on strengthening the systems within cyberspace, such as creating a
national cyber ecosystem by creating a regulatory framework and creating norms and standards, as
well as law enforcement. Although some argue that cyberspace should not be regulated and should
remain free from government and politics (Barlow 1996), legal conduct is still needed to maintain
stability in cyberspace.

It is interesting to reflect on the ITU pillars and contrast these with the pillars outlined above. The
ITU pillars divide cybersecurity into five working areas – legal, technical and procedural,
organizational, capacity-building and international cooperation.
We argue that the five above-mentioned pillars may best describe the critical cyber aspects inside an
institution that need to be strengthened. The pillars depicted in Figure 2 cover comprehensive
aspects of building cybersecurity and are grounded in 12 recognizable frameworks.
Three of the five ITU working areas (technical and procedural, organizational and international
cooperation) can be covered by the organization pillar. This organization pillar acts as the functional
structure that controls cyberspace, which according to the finding overarches two main functions:
inward strategic action (increasing the capacity and capability of the organization, which
encompasses the technical and procedural, capacity-building and organizational pillars of ITU), and
outward strategic action (intensifying cooperation to secure cyberspace, as in the international
cooperation pillar in the ITU work area).
We also note that there are two main aspects that are not covered by the ITU work areas: the
infrastructure and technology pillars. These two pillars are the foundation that build cyberspace.
While we recognize that capacity-building is important for building up cybersecurity, we tend to
include it as an embedded aspect in the human and organization pillars.

5.3 Cybersecurity framework life cycle
Implementing a cybersecurity project is not straightforward, with the organization building a
strategy and deploying actions, and the programme being run as planned; accordingly, it must be a
repeatable process, incorporating continuous improvement, monitoring and analysis (ENISA 2014;
ISACA 2013). Therefore, some CSFs recommend following a continuous, step-by-step process. We
define this as the cybersecurity life cycle.
Accordingly, the cybersecurity life cycle is a series of processes and a step-by-step routine for
securing cyberspace as a project; it comprises the processes of initial planning, process
implementation and evaluation. The output of the evaluation phase is used to maintain and adjust
the strategy (ENISA 2012b, p. 7) and as an input for replanning cyber strategy. As we can associate
securing cyberspace with a project, this process can be found in nearly every framework. An
example of this life cycle is shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Cybersecurity framework life cycle

INSERT TABLE 6

From Table 7, we can see that the life cycle process comprises three common steps: profiling the
cyber state, delivering the strategy, and evaluation. The profiling process is intended to profile the
current cyber situation, i.e. to identify, plan, determine requirements, set targets, profile and assess
the current situation of the cyber state. The second step, which is the main step, is to deliver the
programme, namely, to execute the programme and facilitate implementation. The last step is an
evaluation of the programme, a review of the results, and an adjustment of the strategy. Evaluation
results from the final step are employed to refine the programme and used in cybersecurity
replanning. Those steps are found in all CSFs; they are excerpted from the various terms but refer to
similar concepts.

Table 7. Cybersecurity life cycle map

INSERT TABLE 7

Since the overall life cycle comprises important life cycle processes, the common understanding of
the life cycle can be divided into profiling, delivering and assuring, allowing the life cycle to be
mapped (as shown in Table 7). The three processes combine into a continuous process, which is
drawn as a cyclic process model in Figure 4.

INSERT FIGURE 4

Figure 4. Three processes of cybersecurity

The profiling process is intended to define the current cyber state. Various terms are used to refer to
profiling. For example, ISO uses ‘plan’, ITU uses ‘ends’, NATO uses ‘preliminary consideration’, WEF
uses ‘starting assumption’, Microsoft uses ‘establishing clear priorities and security baselines’, CTO
uses ‘approach’ and ISACA uses ‘plan and design’. These common terms refer to a process taken
before cybersecurity is implemented. The profiling process is a planning process created by
developing the assumptions, aligning with core values, budgeting, gathering resources and
establishing a legal environment.
The delivering process is the core action for securing cyberspace. This process should be pursued
based on the assumptions listed in the profiling process. Some CSFs use an explicit term such as
‘protect’ (NIST), ‘do’ (ISO), ‘ways-means’ (ITU) or ‘implement and operate’ (ISACA), while others use
implicit terms that primarily describe the main actions in the CSF. The delivering process entails
implementing actions for securing cyberspace based on the assumptions developed in the profiling
process, such as building online trust, creating CCC and promoting uptake.
The assuring process is the review of the overall process of delivering and the result of feedback
gathered to ensure a better cybersecurity process. Cyber assurance is a way to reshape the quality of
cybersecurity output that meets the desired goal. The assuring process entails reappraisal (i.e. audit,
feedback, self-assessment and creating metrics), modification (in response to the internal and
external situation) and refinement (of operation and strategy).

5.4 Cybersecurity framework: shared concept mapping
The two perspectives of pillars and life cycles can be combined to create a generalized cybersecurity
strategy (See Table 8). The first view is of the process to secure cyberspace, which mainly falls into
profiling, delivering and assuring. The second view considers what objects need to be strengthened
in cyberspace or the cybersecurity pillars, namely, human, organization, infrastructure, technology,
and law and regulatory.
As we can see in Table 8, strengthening the five cyber pillars can be divided into (1) profiling the
current cyber state, (2) delivering the security actions based on the profile, and (3) ensuring that the
security delivery is on track and provides feedback to the first process. Table 8 shows the overall
shared concept of a CSF.
Table 8. Summary of cybersecurity framework

INSERT TABLE 8

6 Concluding remarks and limitations
This paper began with the aim of identifying shared concepts across 12 CSFs and classifying their
differences. Using the grounded theory paradigm, we divide the CSFs into two main parts: context
and shared concepts.
In seeking cybersecurity policy, one noteworthy question to ask is what drives its development
(Pawlak and Barmpaliou 2017, p. 124). This question leads to comprehending organizations’
initiatives on developing CSFs through apprehending the CSFs’ distinctive features. In this study, we
found that the development of CSFs can generally be reflected by: 1) promoted action (positive
interdependence vs. increasing capacity), 2) driver (cyber risk vs. promoting values), 3) framework
milieu (organizational, regional and international), and 4) audience (audience-specific vs. the acrossthe-board CSF).
In addition, understanding CSFs as a normative concept is an ongoing endeavour. As indicated in the
work of the ITU (2018) there is a desire to develop generic strategies that can be applied globally,
such as by creating a cybersecurity toolkit. Therefore, addressing the question that leads to the
development of general cybersecurity concepts contributes to the development of a general model
of cybersecurity policy.
Attempting to respond to that inquiry, this study has mapped the normative position of CSF onto
three central concepts, encompassing the seven action themes, five pillars/objects and three-process
life cycle. The seven action themes that are frequently discussed in the CSFs are, namely, 1) building
online trust; 2) coordination, cooperation and collaboration, 3) profiling the cyber state, 4) promoting
uptake, 5) reviewing, 6) establishing a legal environment, and 7) creating standards. We also raise
five pillars or cybersecurity objects that are most often discussed in CSFs, namely, human,
organization, infrastructure, technology and law and regulation. In addition, the three-process life
cycle includes profiling, delivering and assuring.
This work contributes in several ways. Policymakers or C-level executives could benefit from the
depiction of distinctive features summarized in section 4, which may help them in choosing the right
policy template for their organizational purpose. Section 4 provides a normative position on existing
CSFs. By narrowing down the organizational purpose and searching for the best-fit context for their
organization, policymakers and C-level executives can select a suitable CSF for their organization. For
example, a company may use the NIST framework, CMM or ISACA framework as their policy
template, as these are suitable for increasing the cyber capacity of the internal organization, rather
than emphasizing an international relationship, which we would find in other CSFs such as the ITU
framework and Microsoft Cybersecurity Manual. To that end, policymakers seeking to develop a
cybersecurity strategy can allocate resources to areas that will contribute to its successful
implementation. It is also potentially possible to allocate these resources over a time period to
account for the different areas of development of the life cycle.
Researchers could benefit from reviewing the mapping concept of the CSF summarized in Table 8.
The seven shared actions, the five pillars and the three life cycles are mapped in this table, providing
researchers with a bird’s-eye view of current CSFs. This mapped table can also be used for

developing a general model of a CSF, since the finding comprehensively covers all elements in every
CSF strategy.
In future development of this work, the five pillars, three life cycles and seven shared actions
identified in Table 8 may be used as an instrument to benchmark cybersecurity progress in an
institution as a Cybersecurity Balanced Scorecard. A dashboard containing the five pillars can be
used to monitor the development of cybersecurity, since these pillars thoroughly cover all aspects of
CSFs that need to be watched, while at the axis, the three life cycles can be used to monitor state
progress for developing cybersecurity, such as in the beginning state (profiling), executing state
(delivering) and reviewing state (assuring). In addition, the seven shared actions in the cross-section
cell can be used to advocate a direction to policymakers or C-level executives when taking required
action. Features in the finding were simplified and summarized but embrace all strategies.
While the distinctive features and shared concepts raised in this paper reflect a number of themes
identified in the CSFs and represent several contributions of this paper, the paper also has some
potential limitations. First, although this paper did not intend to oversimplify the concepts involved
in securing cyberspace in all CSFs, grouping a number of concepts and paragraphs into a concise
view, however, potentially detracts from the essential concept brought by each CSF. Consider the
example of when we discussed the profiling theme: we defined profiling the cyber state as
generically as we could. It can refer to profiling the cyber state of the organization as well as profiling
the cyber state in a larger institution, such as a country. However, we attempted to avoid
oversimplifying the concepts gathered from the CSFs. Second, this work has been conducted by a
group of researchers. Therefore, the discussion reflects the researchers’ views of the overall CSF
during the work. Third, we made limited use of document analysis alone as the main methodology in
this work (Bowen 2009). However, the literature suggests using document analysis alongside other
methodologies to corroborate findings, such as by triangulating data or employing mixed-methods
studies.
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Table 1. Cybersecurity framework documents

Years

Documents

2004 A Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy: a Multidimensional and
Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating a Culture of Cybersecurity (OAS 2004)
2007 The Report of the Chairman of High-Level Experts Group (HLEG) on the ITU Global
Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) (Schjølberg 2007)
2009 Cybersecurity Guide for Developing Countries (ITU 2009)
2010 BSA Global Cybersecurity Framework (BSA 2010)
2012 Cybersecurity Policy Making at a Turning Point: Analysing a New Generation of National
Cybersecurity Strategies for the internet Economy (OECD 2012)
2012 Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World Pathways to Global Cyber Resilience
(WEF 2012)
2012 National Cyber Security Strategies: Setting the course for national efforts to strengthen
security in cyberspace (ENISA 2012b)
2012 ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (ITU 2012)
2012 Partnering for Cyber Resilience: Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World Principles and Guidelines (WEF 2012a)
2012 Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World: Pathways to Global Cyber Resilience
(WEF 2012b)
2012 National Cyber Security Framework Manual (Klimburg 2012)
2012 ISO/IEC 27032:2012 Information technology — Security techniques — Guidelines for
cybersecurity (ISO/IEC 2012)
2012 National Cyber Security Strategies: Practical Guide on Development and Execution (ENISA
2012a)
2013 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 - Information Security Management (ISO/IEC 2013)
2013 Transforming Cyber Security (ISACA 2013)
2013 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace (EC
2013)
2013 Developing a National Strategy for Cybersecurity: Foundations for Security, Growth, and
Innovation (Microsoft 2013)
2014 An Evaluation Framework for National Cyber Security Strategies (ENISA 2014)
2014 Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World: Implications for Enterprises (WEF
2014)
2014 Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (NIST 2014)

2014 Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model (CMM) (GCSCC 2014)
2014 Commonwealth Cybergovernance Model (Commonwealth 2014)
2015 Cyber Maturity in the Asia-Pacific Region 2015 (ASPI 2015)
2015 Partnering for Cyber Resilience: Towards the Quantification of Cyber Threats (WEF 2015)
2015 Commonwealth Approach for Developing National Cybersecurity Strategies: A guide to
creating a cohesive and inclusive approach to delivering a safe, secure and resilient
cyberspace (CTO 2015)
2017 Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) (ITU and ABIresearch 2014, 2015; ITU 2017a)

Table 1. Cybersecurity frameworks from IGOs, NGOs, academic institutions, corporations and
governments
ID

Framework

Document(s)

[1]

Year
Started
2004

Organization of
American States (OAS)
Cybersecurity Strategy

[2]

2007

Global Cybersecurity
Agenda
(ITU-GCA)

[3]

2010

[4]

2012

Business Software
Alliance (BSA)
Framework
World Economic
Forum (WEF)
Principles and
Guidelines

A Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy: a
Multidimensional and Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating a
Culture of Cybersecurity (OAS 2004)
• The Report of the Chairman of High-Level Experts
Group (HLEG) on the ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda
(GCA) (Schjølberg 2007)
• ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (ITU 2012)
• Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) (ITU and ABIresearch
2014, 2015; ITU 2017a)
BSA Global Cybersecurity Framework (BSA 2010)

[5]

2012

[6]

2012

[7]

2012

European Union (EU)
Cybersecurity Strategy

[8]

2013

[9]

2013

[10]

2014

[11]

2014

[12]

2015

Microsoft
Cybersecurity Manual
ISACA Cybersecurity
Nexus
National Institute of
Standards and
Technology (NIST)
Framework
Cyber Security
Capability Maturity
Model (CMM)
Commonwealth
Cybersecurity
Guidelines

Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of
Excellence
(CCDCOE) Manual
ISO 27032

Partnering for Cyber Resilience: Risk and Responsibility
in a Hyperconnected World – Principles and Guidelines
(WEF 2012a)
• Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World:
Pathways to Global Cyber Resilience (WEF 2012b)
• Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World:
Implications for Enterprises (WEF 2014)
National Cyber Security Framework Manual (Klimburg 2012)
•

ISO/IEC 27032:2012 Information technology — Security
techniques — Guidelines for cybersecurity (ISO/IEC 2012)
• National Cyber Security Strategies: Practical Guide on
Development and Execution (ENISA 2012a)
• Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An
Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace (EC 2013)
Developing a National Strategy for Cybersecurity: Foundations
for Security, Growth, and Innovation (Microsoft 2013)
Transforming Cybersecurity (ISACA 2013)
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
(NIST 2014)
Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model (GCSCC 2014)
•

Commonwealth Approach for Developing National
Cybersecurity Strategies: a guide to creating a cohesive
and inclusive approach to delivering a safe, secure and
resilient cyberspace (CTO 2015)

ID

Year
Started

Framework

Document(s)
•

Commonwealth Cybergovernance Model
(Commonwealth 2014)

Table 3. Various contexts of cybersecurity frameworks
Year

2004

2007

Framework
OAS
Cybersecurity
Strategy
ITU-GCA

Promoted action
Positive
interdependence
Positive
interdependence

• Positive
interdependence
• Increasing cyber
capacity

Driver

Milieu

Audience

Risk-centric

Regional

OAS member
country

Value-centric

International

ITU members

Risk-centric

International

Government

Risk-centric

International

WEF members

Value-centric

Regional

NATO members

2010

BSA Framework

2012

WEF Principles
and Guidelines

2012

CCDCOE Manual

2012

ISO27032

Positive
interdependence

Risk-centric

International

Organization

2013

Microsoft
Cybersecurity
Manual

• Positive
interdependence
• Increasing cyber
capacity

Risk-centric

International

Government

2013

EU
Cybersecurity
Strategy

Positive
interdependence

Value-centric

Regional

EU members

2013

ISACA
Cybersecurity
Nexus

Increasing cyber
capacity

• Value-centric
• Risk-centric

Internal
Organization

Organization

2014

NIST Framework

Increasing cyber
capacity

• Value-centric
• Risk-centric

Internal
Organization

Organization

2014

CMM

Increasing cyber
capacity

Risk-centric

Internal
Organization

Organization

2015

Commonwealth
Cybersecurity
Guidelines

Positive
interdependence

• Value-centric
• Risk-centric

Regional

Commonwealth
country

• Positive
interdependence
• Increasing cyber
capacity
• Positive
interdependence
• Increasing cyber
capacity

Table 4. Aspiring value-centric drivers for developing cyber strategy
Frameworks
CCDCOE Manual
Commonwealth
Cybersecurity Guidelines

EU Cybersecurity Strategy

ITU-GCA

OAS Cybersecurity Strategy
NIST Framework
ISACA Framework

Aspiring drivers

National security drives the creation of the National Cybersecurity
Strategy, which should account for the following:
• The 5 mandates
• The 5 dilemmas
Applying the Commonwealth principles
Promoting EU values
Protecting fundamental rights
Access for all
Democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder governance
• A shared responsibility to ensure security
Mandated from the High-Level Experts Group (HLEG) meeting, which is
asking for a commitment by member countries to a Global Cybersecurity
Agenda (GCA) to work on five key Work Areas:
• Legal
• Technical and procedural
• Organisational structures
• Capacity-building; and
• International cooperation.
Mandated by the following resolutions:
• AG/RES. 2004 Cybersecurity Strategy (RESOLUTION)
• AG/RES. 1939 (XXXIII-O/03) Development of an Inter-American
Strategy to Combat Threats to Cybersecurity
Business Strategy
Business Strategy
•
•
•
•

Table 5. Shared concepts of cybersecurity frameworks

Shared concepts
Building online trust

Definition
To enhance the confidence of all stakeholders in using
cyberspace
Digital redundancy
To maintain resilience and capabilities or services that
were impaired due to a cybersecurity event
Protecting critical assets of
To protect intangible and tangible critical cyber assets,
cyberspace
such as privacy, data and infrastructure
Promoting privacy online
To promote protection of identifiable information against
unauthorized access and disclosure
Creating coordination,
To coordinate, cooperate and collaborate with cyber
cooperation and collaboration security stakeholders including external and internal
organizational entities
External
Outward actions
Alliancing and partnering To cooperate with other entities with the same mutual
benefit to combat cyber threats and respond to events
and incidents
Diplomacy and soft
To use the ability to define international norms and
power
standards relevant to international behaviour in
cyberspace, representing a form of ‘soft power’
Information sharing
To cooperate by sharing information regarding threats
and attacks to keep up-to-date with the latest threats
and developments
Promoting inclusion
To promote inclusion and share responsibility across all
stakeholders in cybersecurity
Third-party uptake
To ensure that third parties not directly subject to
internal organizational policies adhere to cybersecurity
Internal
Inward actions
Communication
To engage with all actors to communicate the strategy
Coordination
To coordinate across the internal system on cybersecurity
mandates
Creating a governance
To create set of frameworks and boundaries for security
management including an organizational structure, a
coordinator or leader, formal policies and guidelines for
some aspects of cybersecurity
Roles and responsibility
To minimize overlapping functions between each
organization by creating clear roles and responsibilities
Profiling the cyber state
To set the goals and budget
Aligning strategy with core
To establish a coherent implementation of the current
values
core values
Budgeting and setting up
To define budgets and resources prior to implementation
resources
Setting up the assumption
To assess what the organization needs and define its
context
Promoting uptake
To fill the gap between unsecure and secure conditions
by increasing cyber capacity, capabilities and the
resilience of internal stakeholders to achieve the same
conditions
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Shared concepts
Awareness

Culture
Research and innovation
Innovative technology
Responsiveness
Human empowerment
Reviewing
Audit and log
Feedback
Programme refinement
Self-assessment
Establishing a legal
environment
Defining policies
Developing strategy and
framework
Law enforcement
Creating standards
Promoting interoperability

Standardizing conduct
Sources/References

Definition
To increase peoples’ capacities in and awareness of
cyberspace, such as creating security guidance, helping
stakeholders understand their roles and responsibilities
in cyberspace, and social engagement
To promote a cybersecurity culture or a national mindset
on cybersecurity
To foster research and innovation
To update or advance technologies and techniques that
are used as reliable tools to fight cybercrime
To identify threats early and increase capacity,
preparedness and engagement when adapting to threats.
This includes creating incident response teams
To enhance human resource capacities
To ensure that the cybersecurity programme is delivered
on target
To establish due care and analysis of the current
implementation
To involve outside observers to report incidents of
misconduct
To refine the programme and evaluate it to achieve
strategy improvements, routinely investing effort to
continuously improve
To identify the emerging trends and needs of evolving
cyberspace by developing cyber matrices
To develop a legal environment as a basis for drawing
legal and illegal activities in cyberspace
To create a legal rationale to conduct action in
cyberspace
To develop a strategy, mechanisms and a roadmap that
function as tactical and direct governance to secure
cyberspace
To enact cyber security law by taking corrective action in
response to misconduct
Having best practices and a standard of conduct
To follow recognized standards, guidelines, conduct,
norms and best practices which are open, global and
accepted internationally, by relying on global standards,
guidelines and practices developed, managed and
updated by industry
To develop and establish minimum conduct
requirements, such as creating a practical and effective
implementation programme and technical guidelines
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Table 6. Cybersecurity framework life cycle

Framework
ITU-GCA

Lifecycle
Plan-do-check-act
The NATO Defence Planning Process, which comprises

CCDCOE Manual

ISO27032

•

Step 1 - Establish political guidance

•

Step 2 - Determine requirements

•

Step 3 - Apportion requirements and set targets

•

Step 4 - Facilitate implementation

• Step 5 - Review results
Plan-do-check-act
Risk assessment and management
•

Microsoft Cybersecurity
Manual

•

Risk assessment
•

Risk identification

•

Risk analysis

•

Risk evaluation

Risk management
•

Prevention

•

Detection

•

Response

EU Cybersecurity Strategy

• Recovery
Developing-executing-evaluating-adjusting

NIST Framework

Identify-protect-detect-respond-recover

Commonwealth
Cybersecurity Guidelines
ISACA Cybersecurity Nexus

Development-delivering-reviewing

Plan-design-build/acquire/create/implement-use/operateevaluate/monitor-update/dispose

Table 7. Cybersecurity life cycle map

ITU-GCA
CCDCOE Manual

EU Cybersecurity Strategy
ISO27032
Microsoft Cybersecurity
Manual
NIST Framework

Commonwealth
Cybersecurity Guidelines
ISACA Cybersecurity Nexus

Profiling
Plan
Step 1 - Establish political
guidance
Step 2 - Determine
requirements
Step 3 - Apportion
requirements and set targets
Developing
Plan
Risk identification
Risk analysis
Risk evaluation
Identify

Delivering
Do
Step 4 - Facilitate
implementation

Executing

Development

Do
Prevention
Detection
Response
Protect
Detect
Respond
Delivering

Plan
Design

Implement
Operate

Assuring
Check-Act
Step 5 Review results

Evaluating
Adjusting
Check-act
Recovery

Recover

Reviewing
Evaluate
Update

Table 8. Summary of cybersecurity framework
Human

Profiling
Budgeting and setting up
resources
Setting the assumption

Organizational Aligning with core values
Budgeting and setting up
resources
Creating governance
Creating roles and
responsibilities

Infrastructure

Setting the assumption
Setting the resources

Technology

Setting the assumption
Setting the resources

Law and
regulatory

Defining policies
Developing strategy and
framework

Delivering
Awareness

Assuring
Feedback

Culture
Promoting privacy online
Training and education
Alliancing and partnering
Communication

Programme refinement
Self-assessment

Coordination
Diplomacy and soft power
Information sharing
Promoting inclusion
Responsiveness
Third-party uptake
Digital redundancy
Innovative technology
Protecting critical asset of
cyberspace
Responsiveness
Standardising conduct
Innovative technology
Promoting interoperability
Research and innovation
Responsiveness
Legal investigation
Standardizing conduct

Audit and log

Audit and log

Legal investigation

Step 1 - Defining
scope

Step 2 - Document
selection

• Defining scope of
research

• Search strategy
(keyword)
• Inclusion and exclusion
criteria

Step 3 - Coding
• Descriptive coding
• Pattern coding

Figure 1. Research protocol

Step 4 Synthesizing
concept
• Analysis

Organization

Infrastructure

Technology

Law and Regulation

Themes
[Based on Action]

Framework

Digital redundancy
Promoting privacy online
Protecting critical assets of cyberspace
Forming alliances and partnerships
Diplomacy and soft power
Information sharing
Promoting inclusion
Third party uptake
Communication
Coordination
Creating governance
Roles and responsibility
Aligning with core values
Budgeting and setting up resources
Setting the assumption
Awareness
Culture
Research and innovation
Innovative technology
Responsiveness
Training and education
Audit and log
Feedback
Program refinement
Self-assessment
Defining policies
Developing strategy and framework
Legal investigation
Promoting interoperability
Standardising conduct
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Figure 1. Theme development process
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